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1 Introduction  
The topic of this master's thesis is public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by means of commitment decisions under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.  
The European Commission (Commission) has in the last two decades been empowered with 
several alternative enforcement instruments to prohibition decisions under Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003.1 These are instruments such as the leniency programme, the cartel 
settlement scheme, and the commitment decision scheme. When Regulation 1/2003 entered 
into force May 1, 2004, the Commission initially believed that commitment decisions would be 
unusual and infrequent.2 However, the number of decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003 turned out to be a lot higher than first expected. Leaving out decisions in cartel cases, 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 has been and still is the dominating enforcement instrument in 
the Commission's enforcement of the European Union (EU) competition rules.3  
The choice between a prohibition decision under Article 7 and a commitment decision under 
Article 9 constitutes an antitrust dilemma. On the one hand, prohibition decisions could set legal 
precedent, ensure effective deterrence through the imposition of a fine, and, by establishing an 
infringement of Articles 101 or 102, provide supporting evidence for third-party private 
litigants in follow-on actions for damages. On the other hand, commitment decisions could 
shorten the administrative procedure, adopt more efficient remedies, and thus have a quicker 
impact on the market. Choosing to adopt a commitment decision would to a substantial extent 
out rule the gains from an Article 7 procedure – and vice versa.  
However, inherent in the scheme, commitment decisions are rarely challenged before the Court 
of the European Union (CJEU). By making a habit out of commitment decisions, the 
Commission moves itself farther away from the judicial branch. Because commitment decisions 
are not challenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), we might risk that a "parallel" 
competition policy will develop outside the scope of judicial review.4 From a general interest 
perspective: With a view to especially judicial development, legal certainty, and legal 
                                               
1 "The Commission" refers to the actions and policies of the Competition Directorate-General (DG COMP).  
2 Allendesalazar, Bach, Bartolini, and others (2010) p. 186. 
3 See Table 1. The distinction of years shown by a blue line corresponds to the mandate of the last three 
Competition Commissioners. Cartel cases are subject to a different settlement scheme and are therefore excluded 
from the statistics. 
4 Allendesalazar, Bach, Bartolini, and others (2010) p. 525.  
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predictability, a too large use of commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
could have crucial consequences.  
It is therefore important to establish the scope of the area of application of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003. Hence, the research question in this thesis is: When is Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 applicable?  
In order to answer the research question of whether one can establish a legal rule on the area of 
application of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, this thesis will address the following questions:  
i) How does the key characteristics of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 define the scope 
of its area of application?  
ii) How does the last sentence in Recital 13 in the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 limit 
Article 9's area of application? 
iii) With an emphasis on judicial development, legal certainty, and legal predictability: 
Should Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 be modified?  
This thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 argues why it is adequate to analyse the commitment decision scheme on the basis 
of EU law. Further, it gives account for the available sources of law and the methodical 
challenges to the following analysis. Together with a brief overview of Articles 7 and 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003, chapter 3 provides an overview of Regulation 1/2003 and its predecessor 
Regulation 17. Furthermore, it presents updated statistics on the use of the two procedures.  
In order to answer the research question, I have organised the following analysis into two 
chapters. Through a comparison of Articles 7 and 9, chapter 4 gives account for the key 
characteristics of Article 9 and asks whether these characteristics influence Article 9's 
applicability. Chapter 5 analyses Recital 13 last sentence in the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 
and asks whether it imposes any limitations to the area of application of Article 9.  
The discussions in chapter 4 and 5 form the basis for the discussions in chapter 6, which asks 
whether Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 needs modifications.  
Finally, chapter 7 presents an overall conclusion on the research question.  
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2 Sources of law and legal method 
This master's thesis conducts a legal analysis of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.5 It does not 
concern the legal basis for the adoption of commitment decisions in the European Economic 
Area (EEA)/European Free Trade Association (EFTA)6 or Norway. This chapter argues why it 
is adequate to analyse the thesis question on the basis of EU law. Moreover, it gives account 
for the available EU sources of law and the legal methodology applied to the following analysis.   
2.1 The legal basis for the following discussions 
Since the Norwegian Competition Act Section 12 (3) entered into force in 2014, the Norwegian 
Competition Authority has not adopted any commitment decisions. The EFTA Surveillance 
Authority (ESA) has adopted one commitment decision.7 By contrast, the Commission has 
adopted 44 commitment decisions since Article 9 entered into force May 1st, 2004.8 Among the 
Norwegian courts, the EFTA Court and the CJEU, only the latter has ruled on the application 
of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. It is evident that this is linked to the Commission’s frequent 
use of the scheme. Because there is little practice on the Norwegian and the EEA/EFTA 
commitment decision schemes, this subchapter argues why Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is 
the adequate starting point for the following analysis.  
The Norwegian Competition Act Sections 10 and 11 are equivalent provisions to the EEA 
Agreement Articles 53 and 54.9 Further, the EEA Agreement Articles 53 and 54 are equivalent 
provisions to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.10  
The Norwegian Competition Act of 2004 Section 12 (3) empowers the Norwegian Competition 
Authority to enforce the Act’s Section 10 and 11 through the adoption of commitment 
decisions. ESA is empowered to enforce the EEA Agreement Article 53 and 54 by means of 
commitment decisions on the basis of the Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA).11 The 
                                               
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1-25.  
6 The EEA consists of the EU and the EFTA member states Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein. The EFTA Member 
State Switzerland is not party to the EEA Agreement.    
7 Case No. 61291, Liechtensteinische Kraftwerke Anstalt and Telecom Liechtenstein AG. 
8 See Table 1. 
9 Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 on competition between undertakings and control of concentrations.  
10 Agreement on the European Economic Area, p. 19-20.  
11 Surveillance and Court Agreement Protocol 4, Part II, Section III Article 9. 
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respectively legal bases for commitment decisions in the EEA/EFTA and Norway are built on 
and largely reflect Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. The Norwegian Competition Act Section 12 
(3), taken into consideration the desire for a harmonized body of rules, is meant to largely 
correspond to the commitment decision provisions set out in Regulation 1/2003/SCA, Protocol 
4, Part II, Article 9.12 The practice related to both Articles is relevant to further interpretation 
of the Norwegian provision.13  
2.2 Sources of law and legal method  
Based on the above, the adequate starting point for examining the research questions is EU law. 
Thus, EU legal methodology is applied to the following research. The scope of this thesis does 
not allow for a thorough elaboration on EU legal methodology. Together with key 
characteristics of EU legal methodology, this subchapter presents the legal method applied in 
the following analysis.  
The EU Treaties and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights are classified as primary 
law.14 Accordingly, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are classified as such. Article 288 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) establishes the legal acts called secondary law, which rank below 
primary law. According to Article 288 TEU, the binding acts include regulations, directives and 
decisions, and the non-binding acts include recommendations and opinions. Primary law does 
not give any guidance as to the applicability of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Regulation 
1/2003 is therefore the primary source of law in the following analysis. However, Regulation 
1/2003 does not provide sufficient guidance to establish a legal rule on the area of application 
of Article 9.  
EU legal methodology is functional and is characterised by a teleological approach to legal 
interpretation. This means that the purpose of a rule is attributed more legal weight than its 
wording.15 The ECJ is the superior judicial interpreter and plays a large role in the interpretation 
of EU legislation.16 However, inherent in the voluntary nature of commitment decisions, there 
are only a few judgments from the ECJ in which Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is interpreted.17  
                                               
12 Prop. 75 L (2012-2013) p. 21-32. 
13 Ibid. p. 142. 
14 Ackermann, Dohrmann, Babusiaux, and others (2017) p. 120.  
15 Ibid. p. 256. 
16 Ibid. p. 527. 
17 C-441/07 Alrosa; C-547/16 Gasorba and Others v Repsol 
Page 8 of 63 
 
In the following analysis, I look towards Recital 13 in the preamble of Regulation 1/2003, the 
preparatory work to Regulation 1/2003, the Commission's decisional practice, and the 
Commission's guidelines. These sources are neither primary nor secondary law and therefore 
they do not have binding legal force. Based on this, the main challenge to the following analysis 
is therefore the lack of binding sources of law. In the following, I will argue why these sources 
nevertheless are attributed legal weight in this thesis. 
Recital 13 in the preamble of Regulation 1/2003 gives expression to a limitation on Article 9's 
area of application. In principle, it "has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as 
a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those 
provisions in a manner clearly contrary to their wording".18 Nonetheless, Recital 13 plays a 
central role in a teleological interpretation of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.19 Further, the 
preparatory work to Regulation 1/2003 also plays a role in purposive interpretation. In this 
regard, the White Paper on modernisation is the prerequisite to the proposal to implement 
Regulation 1/2003 and is extensively reasoned.20 Where the text is unambiguous, these sources 
will be attributed weight in the following analysis. Conversely, where the text in the recital or 
the preparatory work is ambiguous, meaning that it can be interpreted differently, it will be 
afforded less weight.  
Further, it is a matter of course that the judgments from the CJEU have greater legal force than 
administrative decisions made by the Commission. This is because the CJEU usually has 
jurisdiction to review the Commission's decisions.21 However, in the enforcement of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, commitment decisions are rarely challenged before the CJEU. Because of 
this, judicial review of commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is limited. 
The Commission's decisional practice is therefore attributed legal weight in the following 
analysis. Closely related to this are the Commission guidelines, i.e. notices. Such instruments 
have been coined soft law and are not legally binding. However, the vagueness of both primary 
and secondary provisions of EU competition law (hard law), leaves the Commission a 
considerable margin of discretion.22 The Commission's guidelines give expression to the 
Commission's own practice and is therefore afforded legal weight in the following analysis.  
                                               
18 C-136/04 Deutsches Milch-Kontor, para. 32. 
19 Ackermann, Dohrmann, Babusiaux and others (2017) p. 249. 
20 White Paper on modernisation. 
21 Lomio and Spang-Hanssen (2009) p. 137-138. 
22 Ackermann, Dohrmann, Babusiaux and others (2017) p. 519.  
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In connection with the Commission's decisional practice, some empirical data is gathered. This 
data is used to shed light on the Commission's practice to provide insight into when the 
Commission has applied Articles 7 and 9 since the introduction of Regulation 1/2003. Together 
with the already collected data on the Commission's decisional practice from 2000-201523, I 
have collected and assembled the data on the Commission's decisional practice from 2016-
2019.24 Supplements to the data from 2005-2015 has been added where such have been missing. 
Furthermore, I have analysed the Commission's decisions from 2005-2019 to produce an 
overview of the procedural steps in the different decisions. Lastly, I have analysed and produced 
an overview of the Commission's decisions in different industrial sectors per year.  
The data provides important background information for answering the research question. The 
empirical data is contained in "Tables and charts" at the end of this paper. 
                                               
23 Wils (2015) pp. 7-8. 
24 The data is updated till May 7, 2019.  
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3 Regulation 1/2003 – overview and 
statistics 
This chapter provides an overview of Regulation 1/2003 and its predecessor Regulation 17, and 
a brief introduction to Articles 7 and 9. Further, the statistics on the application of Articles 7 
and 9 of Regulation 1/2003 are accounted for. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the 
current enforcement system and how it has been applied in practice.  
3.1 The modernisation reform  
Prior to May 1st, 2004, the legislative basis for enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were 
contained in Regulation 17.25 Under Regulation 17, the Commission had the sole power to grant 
an individual exemption under Article 101 (3).26 Under this authorisation system, undertakings 
had to notify their practices described in Article 101 (1) in order to apply for an individual 
exemption under Article 101 (3). Hence, Regulation 17 contained an ex ante control 
mechanism, meaning that the Commission assessed the undertaking's conduct beforehand.27 
This resulted in undertakings systematically notifying their practices.28 In 1967, the 
Commission was faced with 37 450 cases that had accumulated since Regulation 17's entry into 
force.29  
Under Regulation 17, the Commission did close some of its investigations on the condition of 
obligations/commitments in several ways. Firstly, the Commission granted "negative 
clearance" under Article 2 of Regulation 17 if the Commission, based on the facts in the case, 
certified that there were no grounds for action. Article 2 did not explicitly open up for this 
practice, but it is clear that several cases were closed by the means of such "negative 
clearance".30 Secondly, in order to speed up the processing of applications for an individual 
exemption under Article (3), the Commission settled its investigations through an informal 
"comfort letter".31 These letters informed undertakings that the notified agreement either did 
                                               
25 EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
26 Jones and Sufrin (2016) p. 886.  
27 White Paper on modernisation, point 24, p. 12 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. point 25, p. 10.  
30 Wils (2015) p. 11.   
31 White Paper on modernisation, point, 34, p. 15. 
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not meet the conditions for Article 101 (1) (negative clearance letter) or that it qualified for 
exemption (exemption letter).32 This became a practice in the early 70's and the Commission 
issued 150-200 "comfort letters" each year.33 Lastly, it could grant a formal individual 
exemption decision with attached obligations under Article 101 (3). According to Article 15 (2) 
(b) of Regulation 17, the Commission could only impose a fine where the undertaking breached 
the obligations in the latter. Hence, the cases that were closed by means of negative clearance 
or "comfort letters" could not be effectively enforced through the threat of a fine.  
The inefficiencies in Regulation 17 led to the White Paper on modernisation, which was the 
prerequisite for proposing Regulation 1/2003.34 Regulation 1/2003 was implemented because 
the Commission saw the need to make enforcement of the competition rules more efficient. The 
Commission needed to "refocus its activities on the most serious infringements".35   
Regulation 1/2003 replaced the centralised notification system in Regulation 17 with a directly 
applicable exemption system under Article 101 (3). This meant that undertakings themselves 
had to assess whether their conduct fulfilled the requirements for an individual exemption under 
Article 101 (3). As part of Regulation 1/2003, Article 9 empowered the Commission to make 
commitments binding on legal grounds on the basis of a new type of formal decision named 
"commitment decision". With Article 9, the legal gap, in which the Commission could not 
effectively enforce compliance with obligations, was largely closed.  
3.2 Article 7 and Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
Chapter III of Regulation 1/2003 is the legal basis for the Commission's decisions in antitrust 
cases. Where the Commission finds that an undertaking has infringed the competition rules, it 
can adopt a formal prohibition decision under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. A prohibition 
decision "may" be combined with the imposition of a fine under Article 23 (2) (a). The 
Commission has, in fact, adopted a prohibition decision in combination with the imposition of 
a fine under Article 23 (2) (a) in 82 % of its prohibition decisions.36  
A commitment decision under Article 9 is a formal decision in which the undertakings 
concerned offer commitments which are made binding by the Commission's acceptance. To 
                                               
32 White Paper on modernisation, 34, p. 15.  
33 Ibid. point 34, p. 15.   
34 White Paper on modernisation.  
35 Ibid. point 13, p. 5  
36 See Table 1. 
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increase transparency, the Commission is required to market test the offered commitments 
through publishing a concise summary of the case and the main content of the commitments, 
cf. Article 27 (4). Interested third parties may then submit their observations. 
3.3 Statistics on decisions 
In this subchapter, statistics are used to illustrate the Commission's practice on adopting Article 
7 and Article 9 decisions. Table 1 shows the Article 7/Article 9 ratio between 2005-2019.37 The 
period 2005-2009 corresponds to the mandate of Neelie Kroes, the period 2010-2014 
corresponds to the mandate of Joaquín Almunia, and the period 2015-2019 corresponds to the 
mandate of Margrete Vestager.  
The decisions from 2005-2009 show a ratio of 33 % prohibition decisions to 67 % commitment 
decisions. In the period 2010-2014, 35 % of the decisions were prohibition decisions, while 65 
% were commitment decisions. The last period, 2015-2019, show a drastic decrease in 
commitment decisions with a ratio of 63 % prohibition decisions to 37 % commitment 
decisions. This means that during the mandate of Margrete Vestager we see a full reverse in the 
use of commitment decisions. Overall, for the years 2005-2019, there have been 43 % 
prohibition decisions to 57 % commitment decisions. 
In connection with the Google Search (shopping) case38, Commissioner Vestager stated, “It’s 
very important not to make a habit out of settlements”. She further stated, “They are much more 
quick and much more smooth and everyone can move on, but still you need occasion to develop 
[case law] and only our judges and going to court can do that”.39 Accordingly, there has in fact 
been a decrease in the use of Article 9 in the period corresponding to the mandate of Vestager. 
In the last three years, 14 out of 19 decisions (74%) have been prohibition decisions. 40 
Vestager's period as Commissioner Competition ends in 2019. Time will tell if these statistics 
signal a new trend.  
                                               
37 See Table 1. 
38 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping).  
39 Oliver and Barker (2015, March 8) (Original bracket.) 
40 See Table 1.  
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4 Key characteristics of the Article 9 
procedure 
The previous chapter established that the commitment decision procedure is more frequently 
used than the Article 7 procedure. In order to answer the research question, this chapter clarifies 
the commitment decision procedure. Three key characteristics of Article 9 are analysed: the 
non-establishment of an infringement, the initiative to the Article 9 procedure, and the 
proportionality of binding commitments. Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 serves as a point of 
reference to demonstrate the differences between the two procedures. 
Article 9 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 states:  
  Commitment decision 
1. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the 
Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings. 
Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that there are 
no longer grounds for action by the Commission. 
4.1 The non-establishment of an infringement  
The first characteristic of Article 9 is that a commitment decision, contrary to Article 7, does 
not establish an infringement of Articles 101 or 102. Article 9 states that the decision "shall 
conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission". The second sentence 
of Recital 13 in Regulation 1/2003 supports this by stating that the case is to be closed, "without 
concluding whether or not there has been or still is an infringement".  
4.1.1 The imposition of a fine 
This characteristic impacts the Commission's powers to impose a fine on the undertaking 
concerned. Article 23 (2) (a) of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission to enforce a 
prohibition decision by imposing a fine where an undertaking "infringes" Articles 101 or 102. 
Because the Commission does not conclude whether or not there has been an infringement of 
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the competition rules in a commitment decision, they consequently cannot impose a fine on the 
undertaking under Article 23 (2) (a). Recital 13 last sentence might give expression to the same 
idea by stating, "Commitment decisions are not appropriate when the Commission intends to 
impose a fine". Recital 13 last sentence is further discussed in chapter 5. 
According to Article 23 (2) (c), to ensure that commitments are complied with, the Commission 
may impose a fine on an undertaking if it breaches the binding commitments. The enforcement 
of commitment decisions thus lies in the threat of a fine for breaching the commitments. The 
Commission has only imposed a fine for breaching binding commitments in the Microsoft 
(tying) case.41 If the Commission imposes a fine on an undertaking under Article 23 (2) (c), the 
Commission is only required to put forward evidence of the breach of the commitments. It is 
therefore an effective enforcement instrument for the Commission.  
4.2 Initiating the Article 9 procedure  
The second characteristic of Article 9 is that the initiative to the Article 9 procedure is different 
from the Article 7 procedure. Briefly, under Article 7, the Commission opens proceedings and 
issues a Statement of Objections before it finally adopts a prohibition decision. Therefore, the 
Commission is the sole initiator to both the Article 7 procedure and the prohibition decision.  
Under Article 9, the undertaking concerned is not obliged to offer commitments, and the 
Commission is not obliged to accept any commitments. This raises the question of who the 
initiator to the Article 9 procedure is.  
4.2.1 Is the Article 9 procedure a derail from the Article 7 procedure? 
The linguistics of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 imply that the Commission is required to 
pursue an Article 7 procedure before adopting a commitment decision under Article 9. This is 
based on the text in Article 9 which states that "Where the Commission intends to adopt a 
decision requiring that an infringement is brought to an end", it may accept the offered 
commitments and make them binding upon the undertaking concerned. This is supported by 
the same terminology found in Article 7, which states, "Where the Commission […] finds […] 
                                               
41 AT.39530 Microsoft (Tying) 06/03/2013 
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an infringement […], it may by decision require the undertakings […] concerned to bring such 
infringement to an end".42 
Likewise, Recital 13 first sentence in the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 states, "where, in the 
course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice being prohibited, 
undertakings offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its concerns, the Commission 
should be able to adopt decisions which make those commitments binding on the undertaking 
concerned".43 
This understand is additionally supported by the explanatory memorandum to the Commission's 
proposal to Regulation 1/2003 which states that Article 9 "empower[s] the Commission to adopt 
decisions accepting commitments offered by undertakings in the course of proceedings in 
which the Commission intends to adopt a decision ordering termination of an alleged 
infringement".44  
Moreover, the Commission notice on best practices supports this understanding by stating, "The 
Commission or the undertaking(s) concerned may decide at any moment during the 
commitment procedure to discontinue their discussions. The Commission can then normally 
continue formal proceedings pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation."45 The word "continue" is 
understood to be something starts again after stopping for a period of time.  
Based on Article 9 itself, Recital 13, the preparatory work and Commission guidelines, one 
might argue that the undertaking concerned is the initiator to an Article 9 procedure. The 
preliminary answer to the question concerning initiation of the Article 9 procedure is therefore 
that the Commission would initially have to pursue a prohibition decision, and that the 
undertaking's action of offering commitments would trigger a shift of procedure. Therefore, 
one may argue that the Article 9 procedure is a derail from the Article 7 procedure.  
4.2.2 The "preliminary assessment" criterion  
According to Article 9, the undertaking concerned has to offer commitments "to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment".46 The content, 
                                               
42 My emphasis.  
43 Recital 13 first sentence in the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 (my emphasis), 
44 Proposal for Regulation 1/2003 (my emphasis). 
45 Commission notice on best practices, point 125 (my emphasis). 
46 My emphasis. 
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length, and level of specificity of a "preliminary assessment" is neither defined in Regulation 
1/2003 nor any other secondary legislation.47  
The original draft proposal to Regulation 1/2003 did not contain the word "preliminary 
assessment" in the text in Article 9. In a Report from the Presidency in the European Council 
(EC) dated May 21, 2002, one of the delegation's position on the text in Article 9 was that "[The 
Italian delegation] prefers a reference to a document by the Commission incorporating a 
preliminary assessment of the business conduct under examination".48 The term "preliminary 
assessment" was added to the draft on September 9, 2002, and the remark by the Italian 
delegation is in this document removed.49 This indicates that the "preliminary assessment" 
criterion was added based on the remark of the Italian delegation. However, there has been no 
mentioning of the term elsewhere in the preparatory work. Without any further reasoning, it is 
not possible to establish the legislature's intentions for adding this term to the text in Article 9. 
The Commission is required to issue a Statement of Objections in the Article 7 procedure. This 
follows from Article 7 (4) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 10 (1) in Regulation 773/2004.50 
The issuing of a Statement of Objections is an important procedural step and "sets out the 
preliminary position of the Commission on the alleged infringements of Articles 101 and/or 
102."51 A Statement of Objections may serve as a "preliminary assessment".52 Uncertainty 
relates to whether the Commission may issue another, less formal document instead of a 
Statement of Objections.  
One might argue that the term "preliminary assessment" indicates that the Commission is 
required to issue a Statement of Objections. This was also the initial view when Regulation 
1/2003 was adopted.53 This corresponds with the understanding that the Commission initially 
needs to pursue a prohibition decision, and that Article 9 is a derail from the Article 7 procedure. 
If the Commission issues a "preliminary assessment", which is not a Statement of Objections, 
it implies that the Commission initially intends to pursue the commitment procedure under 
Article 9.54 This would conflict with the system in Regulation 1/2003.  
                                               
47 Georgiev (2007) p. 1019.  
48 Report from the Precidency, Doc No. ST 8383 2002 INIT (2002) note 36, p. 27. In the relevant document, "IRL" 
is Ireland. Therefore, "I" is Italy. 
49 Report from the Competition Working Party, Doc. No. ST 11791 2002 INIT (2002), p. 21.  
50 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the    
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 
51 Commission notice on best practices, point 82, p. 21.  
52 Wils (2006) p. 11 
53 Temple Lang (2003) pp. 1-2.  
54 Schweitzer (2008) p. 9. 
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Moreover, requiring a Statement of Objections would safeguard the interests of the 
undertakings concerned.55 This is because in a Statement of Objections, the Commission must 
articulate a theory of harm, and set forth evidence that supports it, giving the parties a chance 
to respond.56 According to the Commission guidelines, a Statement of Objections' purpose "…is 
to inform the parties concerned of the objections raised against them with a view to enabling 
them to exercise their rights of defence".57 The Article 9 "preliminary assessment" criterion 
seems to largely serve the same purpose.58 A Statement of Objections does not give expression 
to a final conclusion on whether or not an undertaking has infringed Articles 101 or 102. It is a 
preliminary conclusion which "does not prejudge the final outcome of the procedure".59 Based 
on this, if a Statement of Objections did prejudge the outcome of the case, requiring a Statement 
of Objections in the Article 9 procedure would contradict the overall system that a commitment 
decision does not establish an infringement of the competition rules. However, because it does 
not prejudge the outcome of the case, requiring a Statement of Objections would not conflict 
with the characteristic of Article 9.  
By contrast, the original proposed text to Article 9 was "…such as to meet the Commission’s 
objections".60 This could indicate that a Statement of Objection was a requirement. The 
Commission later changed the text to "…the Commission’s concerns", as the wording is today. 
This indicates that the legislature's intention was not to make the issuing of a Statement of 
Objections a criterion under Article 9.  
Furthermore, Article 2 of Regulation 773/2004 states that the Commission may initiate 
proceedings with a view to adopt a decision pursuant to Chapter III of Regulation 1/2003 at any 
point in time, "but no later than the date on which it issued a preliminary assessment as referred 
to in Article 9 (1) […] or a statement of objections".61 It is therefore clear that Regulation 
773/2004 makes a distinction between a preliminary assessment and a Statement of Objections. 
Without providing any further definition of the term, Article 2 of Regulation 773/2004 merely 
states that there is a difference between these two "documents". It is nevertheless not clear what 
this difference consists of.  
                                               
55 Schweitzer (2008) p. 9.  
56 Cooke (2006) p. 5.   
57 Commission notice on best practices, para. 82.  
58 Cooke (2006) p. 5.   
59 MEMO/07/314. 
60 Note from General Secretariat of the Council, Doc. No. ST 5158 2001 INIT, p. 13 (my emphasis). 
61 Regulation 733/2004.   
Page 18 of 63 
 
The Commission's view is that it can first open proceedings and then have a State of Play 
meeting with the undertaking(s) concerned.62 According to the Commission, it would during a 
State of Play meeting consider whether the undertaking(s) show(s) willingness to discuss 
commitments and thereinafter send the undertaking(s) a preliminary assessment.63 The 
Commission's view is that "Once the Commission is convinced of the undertakings' genuine 
willingness to propose commitments which will effectively address the competition concerns, 
a Preliminary Assessment will be issued".64 Therefore, the description of the case as given in 
the State of Play meeting is, in practice, the main basis for the undertaking concerned to decide 
whether to offer commitments or not.65   
This practice allows the Commission and the undertaking(s) to negotiate commitments outside 
of the procedure that Regulation 1/2003 Article 9 seems to require. In the Coca-Cola case66 the 
proceedings were formally opened on September 29, 2004. The Commission issued its 
preliminary assessment October 15 the same year, and Coca-Cola submitted its commitments 
on October 19 – only four days later. Some argue that the commitments in the Coca-Cola case 
were drafted before the preliminary assessment was issued.67 A "preliminary assessment" is 
meant to have an equivalent function to the Statement of Objections under Article 7, in which 
it should be a significant check on the Commission when it discusses commitments with the 
undertaking.68 In order to have this function, the preliminary assessment must precede the 
negotiations on commitments.69 The fact that the Commission issued a preliminary assessment 
only four days before the commitments were offered in the Coca-Cola case indicates that the 
Commission saw this criterion as a mere formality in this case.70  
In all of the cases that have been closed by means of a commitment decision, the Commission 
issued a Statement of Objections in 40 percent of them.71 Contrary, the Commission issued a 
"preliminary assessment" in 60 percent of its commitment decisions.72 The lengths of the 
preliminary assessment varies from around ten to seventy pages, which is about one-tenth of 
                                               
62 A "State of Play meeting" is voluntary and can contribute to the quality and efficiency of the decision-making 
process and to ensure transparency and communication between the Directorate-General for Competition and the 
parties, notably to inform them of the status of the proceedings at key points in the procedure, see the Commission 
notice on best practices para. 61.  
63 European Commission (2013) p. 8. (roadmap)  
64 Commission notice on best practices (2011) para 121.  
65 Blanco, Jörgens, Sauer, and others (2013) p. 579.  
66 Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 – Coca-Cola 
67 See Sweitzer (2008) p. 9; Georgiev (2007) p. 1019; Rab, Monnoyeur, and Sukhtankar (2010) p. 173.  
68 Schweitzer (2008), note 55, p. 10.  
69 Ibid.   
70 Cooke (2006) p. 6.  
71 See Table 3  
72 See Table 3.   
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the length of a Statement of Objections.73 The average length of commitment decisions is 21 
pages, while the average length of prohibition decisions is 160 pages.74 In Rambus75, the 
commitment decision has 17 pages in which 4 of them are dedicated to the "practices raising 
concerns". In Intel76, the prohibition decision has 518 pages in which 225 pages are dedicated 
to the analysis of the abuse of dominance.77 Thus, the "preliminary assessment" criterion opens 
up for an easy way to bypass the complexity of articulating a theory of harm that would be 
subject for judicial review and the risk that the decision would be challenged before the CJEU.78  
However, issuing a less formal and shorter document as a "preliminary assessment" 
corresponds with the objectives of Article 9 set out in Alrosa.79 In Alrosa, the ECJ stated that 
"Article 7 aims to put an end to the infringement that has been found to exist and Article 9 aims 
to address the Commission’s concerns following its preliminary assessment".80 The ECJ further 
stated:  
This is a new mechanism […] which is intended to ensure that the competition rules 
[…] are applied effectively, by means of the adoption of decisions making commitments 
[…] binding in order to provide a more rapid solution to the competition problems 
identified by the Commission, instead of proceeding by making a formal finding of an 
infringement. More particularly, Article 9 of the regulation is based on considerations 
of procedural economy, and enables undertakings to participate fully in the procedure, 
by putting forward the solutions which appear to them to be the most appropriate and 
capable of addressing the Commission’s concerns.81 
Because of the clearly formulated objectives of Article 9 in Alrosa, requiring a Statement of 
Objections in an Article 9 procedure would not be appropriate from a procedural economic 
perspective. As illustrated in the Rambus and Intel cases, it is evident that issuing a Statement 
of Objections requires more resources than issuing a preliminary assessment.  
 
                                               
73 Blanco, Jörgens, Sauer, and others (2013) p. 580.  
74 Mariniello, Mario (2014) p. 7. referred to in Jenny (2015) p. 734.  
75 Case COMP/38.636 – Rambus. 
76 Case COMP/C-3 /37.990 – Intel.  
77 Mariniello, Mario (2014), note 7, p. 3. referred to in Jenny (2015) p. 734.  
78 Jenny (2015) p. 734 
79 C-441/07 Alrosa. 
80 Ibid. para. 46.  
81 Ibid. para. 35 (my emphasis). 
Page 20 of 63 
 
4.2.3 Partial conclusion  
The unambiguous text in Article 9 itself, Recital 13 first sentence, the preparatory work and the 
Commission guidelines imply that the Commission initially has to pursue an Article 7 
procedure. Because a preliminary assessment, which is not a Statement of Objections, is not 
sufficient in the Article 7 procedure, the Commission's purpose of issuing a preliminary 
assessment would be to initiate discussions concerning commitments under Article 9. It is 
difficult to see that the Commission's practice on issuing a preliminary assessment reconciles 
with the overall system in Regulation 1/2003.  
By contrast, based on the distinction made between the two documents in Regulation 773/2004 
and the clearly formulated efficiency objectives in Alrosa, one cannot interpret Article 9 to 
require a Statement of Objections. This understanding prevails because the efficiency 
objectives of Article 9 are clearly formulated. Therefore, these objectives afforded greater legal 
weight than the linguistic and system-oriented interpretation of Regulation 1/2003. However, 
there is no legal basis for the Commission to negotiate commitments before issuing a 
preliminary assessment. The bottom-line criterion is therefore that the "preliminary assessment" 
has to precede the negotiation on commitments.  
On the basis of the above, and in similarity to the initiative under the Article 7 procedure, the 
Commission may be both the initiator to the Article 9 procedure and the final commitment 
decision. This depends on whether the Commission issues a "preliminary assessment" or a 
Statement of Objections.  
4.3 The proportionality of binding commitments 
The third characteristic of Article 9 is that, contrary to Article 7, it does not explicitly mention 
the principle of proportionality. The Commission's discretion to which commitments it can 
accept would influence the area of application of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Therefore, 
this subchapter raises the question of whether there are any limitations as to which commitments 
the Commission can make binding.   
4.3.1 The principle of proportionality under Articles 7 and 9  
The Article 7 procedure empowers the Commission to impose remedies on undertakings which 
they have found to have breached the competition rules. Article 7 makes a distinction between 
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two types of remedies: behavioural and structural remedies. The first involves a change of 
behaviour and the latter involves a change to the structure of an undertaking i.e. the divestiture 
of assets.82 The principle of proportionality is explicitly mentioned in Article 7. Under Article 
7, the Commission always has to choose behavioural remedies over structural remedies if they 
are sufficiently effective. The Commission has only imposed structural remedies in the ARA 
foreclosure case83, which constitutes 3 % of all prohibition decisions after 2005.84 Hence, one 
can say that structural remedies are very rare in decisions under Article 7.  
Contrary, Article 9 mentions neither behavioural or structural remedies/commitments nor the 
principle of proportionality. However, it is clear that the Commission in practice accepts both 
types of commitments under Article 9.85 These differences raise the question of whether or not 
the Commission can accept farther-reaching remedies under Article 9 than what it can impose 
on an undertaking under Article 7. Further, do the same limitations to structural remedies under 
Article 7 apply to Article 9?  
4.3.2 Alrosa v. Commission 
Alrosa is the very first judgment on commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003.86 Before discussing the judgment, it is appropriate to provide an overview of the facts 
of the case.  
In 2006, De Beers was the largest diamond mining company in the world.87 De Beers' sales 
encompassed rough diamonds acquired from the Russian state-owned entity Alrosa, which was 
the second largest diamond producer on the worldwide market at the time.88 Under an 
agreement between the two undertakings, De Beers were to purchase substantial amounts of 
rough diamonds from Alrosa during a period of five years. Alrosa would essentially sell the 
entire production of rough diamonds, which was meant for export, to De Beers.89 De Beers and 
Alrosa both notified the agreement and applied for negative clearance or, if this failed, an 
individual exemption under Regulation 17. 90  The Commission concluded that such exemptions 
                                               
82 MEMO, 8.3.2013 
83 Case AT.39759 – ARA foreclosure 
84 See Table 1. 
85 See Table 3.  
86 C-441/07 P Alrosa 
87 Case COMP/B-2/38.381 – De Beers, point 3, p. 3. 
88 Ibid. point 7, p. 3. 
89 Schweitzer (2008) p. 14.  
90 Case COMP/B-2/38.381 – De Beers, point 11, p. 4.  
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were not available and issued a Statement of Objections on January 14, 2003.91 When 
Regulation 1/2003 entered into force May 1, 2004, De Beers and Alrosa offered joint 
commitments under Article 9. These commitments were market tested, and negative comments 
by third-parties resulted in the Commission asking De Beers and Alrosa to offer new 
commitments.92  
The Commission requested both undertakings to submit new joint commitments which were to 
lead to a complete cessation of their trading relationship from 2009.93 Only De Beers offered 
such commitments and the Commission made them binding by adopted an Article 9 decision.94 
Alrosa appealed to the CJEU for annulment. It claimed that the Commission had exceeded its 
powers by ordering complete cessation of the trading relationship and prohibiting future 
contracts for the sale or purchase of rough diamonds between Alrosa and De Beers for an 
indefinite period of time. Alrosa argued that the commitments went beyond what was 
appropriate and necessary to meet the Commission’s concerns under what is today Article 102 
TFEU.95 
The General Court's (GC) judgment96 found that the principle of proportionality applied to 
Article 9 in the same way as it applies to prohibition decisions under Article 7.97 Further, the 
General Court found that the commitment which prohibited future trading relations between De 
Beers and Alrosa for an indefinite period of time was disproportionate to the alleged 
infringement of Article 102.  
The Commission appealed the judgment to the ECJ, which annulled the judgment from the 
General Court in its entirety. The ECJ starts by stating that "The specific characteristics of the 
mechanisms provided for in Articles 7 and 9 […] and the means of action available under each 
of those provisions are different, which means that the obligation on the Commission to ensure 
that the principle of proportionality is observed has a different extent and content, depending 
on whether it is considered in relation to the former or the latter article".98 Based on these 
differences, the ECJ stated that Articles 7 and 9 "pursue different objectives"99 and that "there 
is therefore no reason why the measure which could possibly be imposed in the context of 
                                               
91 Ibid. point 12, p. 4. 
92 Schweitzer (2008) p. 14-15. 
93 Schweitzer (2008) p. 14-15. 
94 Ibid. p. 15. 
95 Ibid. p. 15. 
96 T-170/06 Alrosa  
97 Ibid. para 92 and 95 referred to in Schweitzer (2008) p. 15. 
98 C-441/07 P Alrosa, para. 38.  
99 Ibid. para 46.  
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Article 7 […] should have to serve as a reference for the purpose of assessing the extent of the 
commitments accepted under Article 9 […], or why anything going beyond that measure should 
automatically be regarded as disproportionate".100  
Further, the ECJ stated that the application of the principle of proportionality by the 
Commission in Article 9 is "confined to verifying that the commitments in question address the 
concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous 
commitments that also address those concerns adequately".101 Accordingly, the Commission is 
not required to seek out less onerous commitments or more moderate solutions than the 
commitments offered to it.102  The Commission only needs to assess whether or not the offered 
commitment address the Commission's concerns and whether or not the undertaking has offered 
less onerous commitments. Judicial review of this assessment "…relates solely to whether the 
Commission's assessment is manifestly incorrect".103  
If the undertaking concerned offer commitments which go beyond what the Commission could 
have imposed on it, the ECJ's reasoning is that the undertaking concerned "…consciously 
accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose 
on them in a decision adopted under Article 7…"104 Based on this, elements of contract law is 
inherent in commitment decisions. The ECJ continues to state, "…On the other hand, the 
closure of the infringement proceedings brought against those undertakings allows them to 
avoid a finding of an infringement of competition law and a possible fine".105 Thus, farther-
reaching commitments under Article 9 are counterweighed by the undertaking's avoidance of 
the establishment of an infringement and a possible fine.  
Lastly, the ECJ stated, "It follows from Article 9 (1) of Regulation No 1/2003 that the 
Commission has a wide discretion to make a proposed commitment binding or to reject it."106 
Because Alrosa affords the Commission a considerable level of discretion to reject or accept 
commitments, one might argue that the balance of power between the Commission and the 
undertaking is askew.  
                                               
100 C-441/07 P Alrosa, para 47.  
101 C-441/07 P Alrosa, para. 41 (my emphasis).  
102 Jenny (2015) p. 754.  
103 Ibid. para. 42 (my emphasis). 
104 C-441/07 P Alrosa, para. 48 (my emphasis). 
105 Ibid para 48 (my emphasis). 
106 Ibid. para 94. 
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Some argue that the Commission's large use of commitment decisions are due to the "overly 
formalistic" approach to Article 9 in Alrosa.107 Further, some argue that Alrosa allowed the 
Commission to enjoy a level of discretion in commitment decisions regarding structural 
remedies, causing the Commission to "move from the objective of restoring competition to a 
wider objective of creating competition conditions by restructuring markets.108 To illustrate the 
different strength of the principle of proportionality in the two procedures, structural remedies 
have only been imposed in one Article 7 decision109 while having been accepted five times in 
Article 9 decisions in the energy sector.110 This will be further addressed in chapter 5.2.2. 
According to Alrosa, if the Commission investigates a breach of Articles 101 and 102, "… the 
Commission has a wide discretion to make proposed commitments binding or to reject it".111 
One might argue that making commitments binding or rejecting them is another way of 
choosing between a commitment decision and a prohibition decision. This is because an alleged 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102 should initially be serious enough for the Commission to 
pursue a prohibition decision. It is not plausible that the Commission would reject the case in 
total because it rejects commitments. Thus, rejecting commitments would in theory mean that 
the Commission "continues"112  to pursue an Article 7 decision. Based on this, one might argue 
that Alrosa affords the Commission the same level of discretion to its choice between pursuing 
an Article 9 or an Article 7 procedure.   
4.3.3 Partial conclusion 
The Alrosa judgment answers the question of whether the Commission can accept farther-
reaching remedies under Article 9 than what it can impose on the undertaking under Article 7 
affirmatively. Alrosa answered the question of whether the same limitations to structural 
remedies under Article 7 apply to Article 9 negatively. The Commission's wide discretion to 
reject or accept commitment is transferred to its discretion to choose the Article 7 or 9 
procedure.  
 
                                               
107 Jenny (2015) p. 709.  
108 Ibid. p. 702.  
109 Case AT.39759 – ARA foreclosure 
110 See Table 3  
111 Ibid.  
112 Commission notice on best practices (2011) point 125. 
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4.4 Concluding remarks  
There are fundamental inconsistencies within Regulation 1/2003. The text in Article 9 and 
Recital 13 first sentence read together with the preparatory work and the Commission 
guidelines, imply that the Article 9 procedure is a derail from an Article 7 procedure. Such an 
understanding would imply that the Commission cannot pursue a commitment decision from 
the opening of a procedure and that it consequently is required to issue a Statement of 
Objections. However, together with the distinction between a preliminary assessment and a 
Statement of Objections in Regulation 773/2004, the efficiency objectives of Article 9 set forth 
in Alrosa are the decisive element in this assessment. The Commission's practice on issuing 
shorter, less formal documents as preliminary assessments is therefore in line with current law.  
The Commission's wide discretion to accept or reject commitments in Alrosa also applies to the 
Commission's choice between a commitment decision procedure and a prohibition decision 
procedure. The only clear limitation to Article 9's area of application is the fact that the 
Commission cannot impose a fine under Article 23 (2) (a) in combination with a commitment 
decision. Recital 13 last sentence gives expression to the same principle. But, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, Recital 13 last sentence can be interpreted in different ways.  
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5 Recital 13's impact on the area of 
application of Article 9 
On the basis of the discussions in chapter 4, one might say that the Commission has a wide 
discretion in pursuing an Article 7 or an Article 9 procedure. However, in order to complete the 
analysis, this chapter discusses which limitations the last sentence of Recital 13 impose on the 
area of application of Article 9.  
5.1 Recital 13 – merely stating the evident? 
Recital 13 last sentence in the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 states, "Commitment decisions 
are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine". 
On the one hand, Recital 13 can be interpreted to merely state that a final commitment decision 
cannot be combined with the imposition of a fine.113 This is based on the view that the 
commitment decision procedure is "…not a mechanism suitable for plea bargaining".114 
Recalling to chapter 4.1, this is because, according to Article 23 (2) (a), a fine can only be 
imposed if the Commission finds that there has been an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. Given that fines can only be imposed in combination with an Article 7 decision, the 
Commission cannot make commitments binding if it wishes to impose a fine. One might argue 
that since the Commission needs to have an initial intent to adopt an Article 7 decision, the last 
sentence of Recital 13 merely states that the possibility to impose fines is excluded once a 
commitment decision is adopted. 
The last sentence of Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 was added to the draft of Regulation 
1/2003 on September 9, 2002. In the preparatory work to Regulation 1/2003, it is stated that 
"the possibility for the Commission to adopt commitment decisions has been limited to cases 
in which it does not intend to impose a fine. This is however logical given that the regulation 
                                               
113 Allendesalazar, Bach, Bartolini, and others (2010) p. 525, 596; Blanco, Jörgens, Sauer, and others (2013) note 
21, p. 577.  
114 Allendesalazar, Bach, Bartolini, and others (2010) p. 186.  
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does not provide for a possibility to settle on the payment of an amount of money".115 The 
legislature's intentions therefore support the understanding that Recital 13 states that a 
commitment decision cannot be combined with a fine under Article 23 (2) (c). 
5.2 The Commission's intention to impose a fine   
On the other hand, Recital 13 last sentence could "indicate that article 9 proceedings are entered 
into at a stage where the Commission has already made up its minds about whether or not the 
infringement warrants the imposition of a fine".116 What distinguishes this view from the above 
is that the Commission has not yet adopted a decision. According to the linguistics of Recital 
13 last sentence, the intention to impose a fine is within the Commission's discretion. To 
establish whether Recital 13 limits the area of application of Article 9, this subchapter examines 
the Commission's decisional practice. 
5.2.1 Hardcore cartels 
Taking into account Recital 13 last sentence of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission states in its 
guidelines that commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases "where the Commission 
considers that the nature of the infringement calls for the imposition of a fine. Consequently, 
the Commission does not apply the Article 9 procedure to secret cartels…"117 Earlier, the 
Commission used the word “hardcore cartels” instead of “secret cartels”.118 Nothing indicates 
that these terms have a different meaning. The term "hardcore cartels" refers to i.e. price fixing, 
market sharing, bid rigging or production or sales quotas.119 
According to this viewpoint, the decisive element is whether the Commission considers that the 
"nature" of the infringement calls for the imposition of a fine. On a question on whether 
participation in hardcore cartels is per se illegal, the Commission answered, "As a matter of 
                                               
115 Council of the European Union, Report of the Competition Working Party of 8 November 2002 in 
Interinstitutional File 2000/0243(CNS) referred to in Blanco, Jörgens, Sauer, and others (2013) note 31, p. 577. 
NB. I have not succeeded in finding this quote in the referred Report or in other preparatory documents files under 
Interinstitutional File 2000/0243(CNS). I have contacted the editor of the book by e-mail asking for further 
elaboration on where to find the referred quote. However, the editor of the book did not succeed in finding the 
quote. He believed the quote was from an earlier version of the document referred to in the book. I requested 
additional documentation from the EU Council, but the documents I was sent did not contain the referred quote 
either. 
116 Wils (2006) p. 11.  
117 Commission notice on best practices, para 166 (my emphasis). 
118 MEMO/04/217 
119 International Competition Network (2015) point 2.B. 
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practice, any agreement which fixes prices, limits its output, shares markets, customers or 
sources of supply or involves other cartel behavior such as bid-rigging will be regarded as a per 
se restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. As these are 
restrictions "by object" it is not necessary to prove the anti-competitive effects of the cartel".120  
Hence, one might argue that cartels are explicitly excluded from the Commission's application 
of Article 9 because their conduct is a per se/restriction by "object" infringement, which opts 
for a fine. Restriction of competition by "object" is a term only used in Article 101 (1) TFEU. 
Article 102 TFEU does not hold the same criteria. This raises a question of whether this means 
that an undertaking's abuse of dominant position can never be per se illegal, and thus should 
never be excluded from the application of Article 9.  
Historically, the EU Courts and the Commission tended to apply per se rules for some types of 
abuses. The law on loyalty rebates is an example of this.121 In Intel, the ECJ cited Hoffmann-
La Roche122, in which the ECJ formulated a rule on exclusivity dealing and loyalty rebates in 
102 TFEU cases in per se terms.123 This rule was followed in several other cases on rebates.124 
Nonetheless, the ECJ added, "However, that case-law must be further clarified in the case where 
the undertaking concerned submits, during the administrative procedure, on the basis of 
supporting evidence, that its conduct was not capable of restricting competition and, in 
particular, producing the alleged foreclosure effects".125 The ECJ's qualification seems to mean 
that the undertaking's conduct can be abusive only where the conduct can be shown to be 
capable of having anti-competitive effects.126 Based on this, the answer to the above-asked 
question is that there is no per se illegality under Article 102 TFEU.127 However, one might 
argue that if per se illegality existed under Article 102 TFEU, these types of abuses also would 
be excluded from the Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003's area of application because their "nature" 
calls for a fine.  
 
                                               
120 International Competition Network (2015) point 2.D. 
121 Whish and Bailey (2018). p. 205.  
122 Case 85/76 Hoffman La-Roche, para 89.  
123 Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 205. 
124 See i.e. T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission EU:T:2003:250, para 56; T-218/99 British Airways plc v 
Commission EU:T:2003:343, upheld on appeal to the ECJ. Referred to in Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 205. 
125 Case C-431/14 P Intel, para 138.  
126 Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 206. 
127 Ibid. p. 207 
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5.2.2 Are other infringements not appropriate for a commitment decision?  
In five of the Commission's prohibition decisions, the undertaking concerned initially offered 
commitments, which the Commission later rejected.128 This raises the question of whether other 
infringements are inappropriate for an Article 9 decision. It is therefore of interest to examine 
the Commission's reasons for rejecting them.   
In the International Skating Union's Eligibility case, the Commission's rejected commitments 
because "the Commission considered [them] as insufficient to solve the identified competition 
concerns in a timely and effective manner".129 In Slovak Telekom, "The commitments were 
considered insufficient to resolve the concerns raised by the Commission".130 In CISAC,  the 
Commission market tested the commitments and more than 80 observations were submitted. 
Based on negative replies from the market test, the Commission held that "It must therefore be 
concluded that the proposed commitments would not give an appropriate answer to the 
competition concerns raised in the Statement of Objections".131 Lastly, in Google Search 
(Shopping), the Commission received 19 complaints to the its initial position that the offered 
commitments could address the competition concerns set out in the preliminary assessment. 
Based on this, "…the Commission considered that it was not in a position to adopt a decision 
under Article 9…"132 The Google Search (Shopping) and CISAC cases are further discussed in 
respectively chapter 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.  
Lastly, the Telekomunikacja Polska133 case stands out. In Telekomunikacja Polska, 
Telekomunikacja Polska (TP) was the only Polish telecommunications operator that had a 
nation-wide fixed telephone network. The Commission held that TP "…consciously planned 
and engaged in practices aimed at hindering AOs from efficiently accessing the incumbent's 
network and using its wholesale broadband products".134 TP offered commitments in April 
2010.135 During the State of Play meetings, "…TP was informed that commitments would not 
be an appropriate way of concluding the case".136 In this regard, the Commission referred to 
recital 13 last sentence of Regulation 1/2003 in a note without further reasoning its rejection. 
                                               
128 See Table 2.  
129 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility, point 19, p. 8. 
130 Case AT.39523 – Slovak Telekom, point 18, p. 19. 
131 Case COMP/C2/38.689 – CISAC, point 72, p. 23.  
132 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), point 73, p. 18.  
133 Case COMP/39.525 – Telekomunikacja Polska 
134 Ibid. point 5, p. 7  (my emphasis.) 
135 Ibid. point 12, p. 8.  
136 Ibid. point 12, p. 8 
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Consciously planning and engaging in practices aimed at hindering other undertakings from 
entering the market is a serious behaviour.  
Based on the above, one might argue that other serious breaches of the competition rules are 
excluded from the application of Article 9.137 This is because the Commission directly referred 
to the last sentence of Recital 13 when rejecting the commitments in Telekomunikacja Polska. 
Nevertheless, it is not certain. In the extension of this, one might argue that if a market test or 
third-party complaints reveal that a case is not proper for a commitment decision after all, the 
infringement in question might have been too serious for an Article 9 decision and should have 
been fined. These specific cases do however not suffice to establish that certain infringements, 
other than hardcore cartels, are excluded from the Article 9 procedure.  
5.2.3 Are commitment decisions particularly suitable in certain industrial 
sectors? 
If we reverse the above-discussed question, this subchapter discusses whether some 
infringements are particularly suitable for a commitment decision. It is of interest to see whether 
certain sectors are more prone to commitment decisions than others. The statistics below show 
the Commission's decisions in the most prevalent sectors. Because of the scope of this thesis, 
the following discussion will only concern the energy and technology sector.  





                                               
137 Dunne (2014) pp. 402-403.  
138 The data is analysed and assembled by the author of this master's thesis.  
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Concerning the energy (gas/oil and electricity) sector, the EU Council initiated the adoption of 
two Directives in 1990 that were to establish common rules for gas and electricity.139 In 2003, 
a second reform established a new set of common rules for this sector.140 After the Commission 
conducted a sectoral inquiry into the European gas and electricity sectors under Article 17 of 
Regulation 1/2003 in June 2005, the Commission concluded that "Despite the liberalization of 
the internal energy market, barriers to free competition remain."141  
In the wake of the sector inquiry, the Commission adopted four commitment decisions in the 
gas and oil sector from 2006 till 2010.142 In 2009, the Council and the European Parliament 
adopted new legislative measures.143 After this, in 2010, the Commission adopted four more 
commitment decisions in this sector – two in the gas and oil sector and two in the electricity 
sector.144  
In the electricity sector, the Commission issued a preliminary assessment in five out of seven 
cases.145 In the oil and gas sector, the Commission issued a preliminary assessment in four out 
of seven cases.146 Based on this, the Commission issued a preliminary assessment in a total of 
64 % of the cases in the energy sector. Because we have already established that the 
Commission is, in practice, the initiator of the Article 9 procedure when issuing a preliminary 
assessment, these statistics imply that the Commission considered the alleged infringements in 
these industrial sectors to be appropriate for a commitment decision.  
Further, five of the commitment decisions in the energy sector made structural commitments 
binding.147 And in four of these five cases, the Commission issued a preliminary assessment.148 
This might imply that the Commission applied Article 9 as an instrument to make farther-
reaching commitments binding instead of imposing remedies under Article 7, which would be 
subject  to a stricter proportionality test.149 Criticism is directed towards Article 9 of Regulation 
                                               
139 Council Directive 90/377/EEC, OJ [1990] L 185/16 and Council Directive 90/377/EEC, OJ [1990] L 185/16, 
referred to in Whish and Bailey (2018) pp. 1020-1021 
140 Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 1021.  
141 COM (2006) 851 final, referred to in Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 1021.  
142 See Chart 2.  
143 Whish and Bailey (2018) p. 1021.  
144 See Chart 2.  
145 See Table 4.  
146 Ibid.  
147 See Table 4.  
148 Ibid.  
149 C/441-07 Alrosa.  
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1/2003 for being legal ground for restructuring markets and that it, as such, can be used as a 
regulatory instrument.150 Based on the statistics, one might argue that the liberalisation of the 
energy sector is a continuous project for the Commission, and that the Commission considers 
cases in the energy sector as particularly suitable for commitment decisions because it is a more 
flexible instrument.        
Moving on to the technology sector, one might expect this sector to be prone to commitment 
decisions. This is because the technology sector is a fast-moving market and a commitment 
decision could end the competition concerns faster. The Commission's competition brief gives 
expression to a similar view. It states, "In contrast, an Article 9 decision is more appropriate 
when the primary target is not punishment for past behaviour, but adjusting future behaviour. 
This makes Article 9 decisions a good option for fast-moving markets, where the speed of 
enforcement is crucial for the effectiveness of the commitments. Of course, if the companies 
concerned are not ready to offer appropriate commitments to the Commission, Article 7 may 
be the only option available to ensure competition rules are complied with."151  
By contrast, Chart 1 above shows that nine out of 14 decisions in the technology sector have 
been closed by means of a prohibition decision.152 If we look at the timeline, an interesting 
development is that prohibition decisions in the technology sector have increased massively in 
the last three years.153 One might argue that the reason that the Commission adopts more 
prohibition decisions in the technology sector is because of the increased focus on technology 
and digitalization the past years. Further, as the Commission stated, the reason for the increase 
in prohibition decisions in the technology sector might be due to the undertakings concerned 
not offering commitments.154 However, these statistics imply that commitment decisions will 
not be particularly suitable in the technology sector. Time will tell whether this is correct or 
not.  
These statistics is used to shed light on the Commission's practice to provide insight into when 
the Commission has applied Articles 7 and 9. One might argue that the characteristics of 
different industry sectors joint with the Commission's practice in these sectors, make certain 
sectors more suitable for Article 9 decisions. According to the statistics, the energy sector, 
which previously was the preserve of state-owned monopolies and has later been 
                                               
150 Hjelmeng (2011) p. 67 (non-official translation by the author of this book). 
151 Competition policy brief (2014) p. 4 
152 See Chart 1.  
153 See Chart 3.  
154 Competition policy brief (2014) p. 4 
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demonopolized and liberalized through Directives, appears to be particularly prone to 
commitment decisions. One might argue that this also applies to other sectors that have been 
monopolized and later liberalized. Further, an increased awareness to the issues relating to 
technology might have resulted in the increase of Article 7 decisions in this sector.  
5.3 Related procedural questions 
If Recital 13 last sentence is to be interpreted to mean that a commitment decision is not 
appropriate when the Commission has made up its mind about whether to impose a fine or not 
beforehand, three procedural questions relating to such an understanding arise.  
Firstly, is a Statement of Objections binding upon the Commission in the way that it cannot 
adopt a commitment decision later? Secondly and reversed, does a preliminary assessment 
exclude the Commission from imposing a fine under Article 23 (2) (a) in a later prohibition 
decision? Lastly, can the Commission fine an undertaking after a failed market test under 
Article 27 (4)? These questions will be addressed in said order. 
5.3.1 From Statement of Objections to a commitment decision 
In the Commission notice on best practices it is stated, "The Statement of Objections will clearly 
indicate whether the Commission intends to impose fines on the undertakings, should the 
objections be upheld…"155 One might argue that the Commission has "intended" to impose a 
fine when it issued its Statement of Objections, and that the Commission has "intended" to 
impose a fine where this is notified in the Statement of Objections.156 Nevertheless, it is not 
possible to assess the Commission's practice on this matter as these documents are not public.157 
However, it was established in chapter 4.2.2 that a Statement of Objections can serve as a 
preliminary assessment. Based on this, a commitment decision could be adopted in a case "…in 
which the Commission intended to impose a fine when it sent the statement of objections, but 
later decided that a fine was not necessary or justified".158 
                                               
155 Commission notice on best practices, point 84, p. 21.  
156 Hjelmeng (2011) p. 18 (non-official translation by the author of this book). 
157 I contacted the Directorate-General for Competition in the EU Commission and requested access to the 
Statement of Objections which were issued in all commitment decisions. This request was rejected on the basis of 
professional secrecy, and that a Statement of Objections is only a preparatory step in the antitrust procedure, and 
that its contains is only provisional in nature.  
158 Temple Lang (2003) p. 2 
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This interpretation is in line with the overall view that an Article 9 decision is a derail from the 
Article 7 procedure. Therefore, the first question must be answered negatively. The 
Commission is not bound by an initial Statement of Objections to pursue an Article 7 decision.  
5.3.2 From a preliminary assessment to a prohibition decision combined 
with a fine 
Reversing the discussion above, the next question is whether a preliminary assessment excludes 
the Commission from imposing a fine under Article 23 (2) (a) in a later prohibition decision.  
We have already established that because a "preliminary assessment" only is a requirement 
under Article 9, the Commission is in fact the initiator to the Article 9 procedure. Because a 
fine cannot be imposed together with a commitment decision, a preliminary assessment would 
imply that the Commission initially does not intend to impose a fine. The Commission has 
stated, "Ultimately, the choice between Article 7 and Article 9 depends on the objectives 
pursued: deterrence, punishment and precedent value on the one hand, efficient and swift 
solving of competition concerns on the other".159 One might argue that if the Commission 
initially issues a preliminary assessment but chooses to finally adopt a prohibition decision 
because of i.e. precedent value, it would be inappropriate to impose a fine on the undertaking 
concerned. This is because the preliminary assessment should not have been issued if the 
Commission intended to fine the firms.160  
This issue is of current interest. Although an extraordinary case, the Google Search (Shopping) 
case is an example of a similar situation.161 It is the only case in which the Commission has 
issued a preliminary assessment before "reverting" to the Article 7 procedure and adopted a 




                                               
159 Competition policy brief (2014) p. 4.  
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161 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping). 
162 See Table 3.  
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In the Google Search (Shopping) case, several complaints from other companies, to both the 
Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCAs), starting in 2009, led the 
Commission to open proceedings against Google on November 2010. After having received 13 
complaints from third-parties against Google between December 2010 and January 2013164, the 
Commission adopted a preliminary assessment addressed to Google on March 13, 2013. Even 
though "Google did not agree with the legal analysis in the Preliminary Assessment and 
contested the assertion that any of the business practices described in it infringe Articles 102", 
it nevertheless offered commitments to the Commission.165 The first set of commitments were 
offered on April 3, 2013. After offering the last set of commitments in April 2014, the 
Commission received five additional complaints against Google.166 The Commission sent 
letters to all complainants rejecting their complaints, which "…outlined the Commission's 
preliminary view that the third set of commitments offered by Google […] could address the 
[…] concerns […] identified in the Preliminary Assessment".167  
In September 2014, after 19 complainants submitted written observations in response to these 
rejection letters, "…the Commission considered that it was not in a position to adopt a decision 
                                               
163 The timelines is assembled by the author of this master's thesis.  
164 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) point 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61.  
165 Ibid. point 65.  
166 Ibid. point 66, 67, 68, 69, 70. 
167 Ibid. point 71.  
Page 36 of 63 
 
under Article 9".168 After additional complaints, the Commission "reverted" to the Article 7 
procedure by issuing a Statement of Objections in regard of one of Google practices in April 
2015.169 The Commission adopted a prohibition decision combined with a € 2.42 billion fine in 
June 2017 – almost seven years after the Commission opened proceedings against Google.170 
This is the second largest fine ever imposed by the Commission – the largest being the € 4.34 
billion fine imposed on Google in the Google Android case.171  
Google claimed that the Commission could not impose a fine because the Commission had 
"…considered adopting a decision under Article 9".172 Google has appealed the prohibition 
decision to the CJEU. In its application for appeal, brought on September 11, 2017, Google 
claimed, among other things, that the decision errs in imposing a fine and that "… a fine was 
not warranted because the Commission  […] selected the case for commitments…".173  
The Google Search (Shopping) case illustrates the procedural issues relating to the 
Commission's understanding of Recital 13 last sentence. However, based on the Commission's 
practice in this one case, one cannot interpret Recital 13 last sentence to impose a restriction on 
the Commission in which it could not impose a fine after initially issuing a preliminary 
assessment. Such an interpretation would to some extent limit the "wide discretion" to reject or 
accept commitment afforded to the it in Alrosa.174 In the extension of this, it would limit the 
area of application of Article 9. If the Commission's discretion was limited once a preliminary 
assessment was issued, an Article 7 decision would not be as effective. Currently, the 
Commission may therefore impose a fine even though it initially issued a preliminary 
assessment. The issue is nevertheless of current interest, and the appeal to the CJEU might be 
an important opportunity to further clarify the area of application of Article 9. 
5.3.3 Adopting a commitment decision after a failed market test  
According to Article 27 (4), the Commission is required to market test commitments if the 
Commission views them as capable of addressing its competition concerns.175 Similarily to the 
previous question, this raises the question of whether the Commission can impose a fine on an 
                                               
168 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) point 73.  
169 Ibid. point 76. One of Google's other practices led to the AT.40411 Google Search (Adsense) case, which was 
closed by means of a prohibition decision combined with a €1.49 billion fine in March 2019. 
170 Ibid. point 754.  
171 Case AT.40099 – Google Android 
172 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), point 730.  
173 Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet (case in progress) (my emphasis).  
174 C-441/07 Alrosa. 
175 Dunne (2014) p. 403.  
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undertaking in a situation where it initially issued a preliminary assessment before reverting to 
the Article 7 procedure after having received interested third-parties' view on the commitments.   
In the CISAC Agreement case, CISAC and 18 of its members offered commitments in March 
2017.176 The commitments were market tested according to Article 27 (4) of Regulation 1/2003, 
and more than 80 observations were submitted.177 In its prohibition decision, the Commission 
stated, "…broadcasters, content providers and certain collective societies, generally considered 
that the proposed commitments would not be effective […] Additionally, certain EEA CISAC 
members who had offered the proposed commitments took the opportunity of the market test 
to criticize them. It must therefore be concluded that the proposed commitments would not give 
an appropriate answer to the competition concerns raised in the Statement of Objections".178 
CISAC was not fined for its breach of Article 101 TFEU. Because CISAC was not fined by the 
Commission, one might argue that the imposition of a fine is not appropriate if commitments 
are market tested and the market test shows that the commitments do not answer to the 
competition concerns. However, the Commission does not discuss the imposition of a fine in 
its decision. Therefore, the Commission's practice does not give expression to such an 
understanding.  
5.4 Concluding remarks  
Recital 13 last sentence has been interpreted to give expression to two different limitations. 
Whether it merely states that a commitment decision cannot be combined with a fine, or that a 
commitment decision is precluded once the Commission has shown its intent to impose a fine, 
is uncertain. It is therefore unclear whether Recital 13 last sentence imposes any limitations on 
the area of application and what those limitations potentially are. Because Recital 13 last 
sentence is ambiguous, its legal weight is limited. The Commission's decisional practice and its 
references to Recital 13 last sentence, which gives expression to the second interpretation, set 
forth the current legal status on the area of application of Article 9. Further, because the 
decisional practice does not clarify the details of this limitation more closely, the Commission 
guidelines are afforded decisive weight. On the basis of the Commission guidelines, the only 
                                               
176 COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC 
177 Ibid. point 71, p. 23 
178 Ibid. point 72, p. 23 (my emphasis). 
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clear limitation to the area of application of Article 9 is therefore that hardcore/secret cartels 
are excluded from the Article 9 procedure. 
This chapter has further established that the Commission can still adopt a commitment decision 
after issuing a Statement of Objections, and that, currently, the Commission can adopt a 
prohibition decision in combination with a fine in a situation where it initially issued a 
preliminary assessment. Further, a failed market test does not preclude the Commission from 
imposing a fine in combination with a prohibition decision either. 
The discussions in chapter four and five establish that the scope of the area of application of 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is wide. Further, the analysis above has not established any 
limitations to Article 9's applicability except the exclusion of hardcore cartels and the fact that 
a final commitment decision cannot be combined with a fine.   
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6 Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 under 
scrutiny  
With considerations to particularly judicial development, legal certainty, and legal 
predictability, this chapter discusses the above-established area of application of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 with a de lege ferenda approach. Instead of aiming critique towards the 
judgment in Alrosa for affording the Commission a too wide discretion to the adoption of 
commitment decisions, this thesis' approach is to discuss whether the legislation needs to be 
modified.  
6.1 Judicial development, legal certainty, and legal 
predictability 
Judicial development is fundamentally necessary in any field of law. Commitment decisions 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 might make judicial development of the EU competition 
rules more sensitive for judicial stagnation. This is based on the fact that commitment decisions 
are rarely challenged before the CJEU. Judicial review is therefore largely limited. Because of 
restricted judicial review, Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 itself is not judicially developed or 
clarified at a satisfactory level.   
A potential risk of adopting commitment decisions is that the judicial development of especially 
Article 102 TFEU could be slowed down or stagnated. This is particularly true for the 
continuously digitalised markets which give rise to both new anti-competitive conduct and anti-
trust issues. From society's perspective, judicial development is important for effective 
enforcement of the competition rules. If Article 102 TFEU is not sufficiently developed, the 
Commission might struggle to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which could harm 
competition and consumers in the long run.  
From the undertakings' perspective, judicial development and a clear set of rules is important 
for legal certainty. Legal certainty is a fundamental principle in EU law, and in Salomie and 
Oltean, the ECJ stated, “As the Court has held on numerous occasions, it follows, inter alia, 
that EU legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable by those who are subject to 
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it”.179 Based on the above, one might argue that on this matter, considerations to judicial 
development should prevail over efficiency considerations.  
By choosing to adopt commitment decisions in novel, complex cases, new antitrust issues may 
not be clarified for the future. With lack of legal certainty and legal predictability, undertakings 
might find it challenging to consider whether or not their conduct constitutes a breach of, 
particularly, Article 102 TFEU. A potential consequence of this might be that the undertaking 
concerned offers commitments although its conduct on the market actually does not breach 
Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. As a result of this, other undertakings might refrain from the 
behaviour in question, which might lead to a restrain on competition. Furthermore, undertakings 
could, in principle, end up being too vigilant. A consequence of this could be lack of innovation, 
which again could harm consumers in the long run.  
With a view to the above-said potential consequences, a suitable modification of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 could be that commitment decisions should be explicitly excluded in novel, 
complex cases. By contrast, commitment decisions stand out to be particularly appropriate in 
straightforward cases in which the law is clear. This is because in such cases, considerations to 
judicial development, legal certainty and legal predictability do not apply in an equal manner. 
It is in this regard positive that we see a noticeable increase of prohibition decisions in the 
technology sector.180 In the extension of this, the length and detail of the commitment decisions 
would help disclose whether the case is too novel or complex for it to be appropriate for an 
Article 9 decision. It would be appropriate to require the Commission to, in its commitment 
decision, "…set out in abstract terms, but in detail, which legal theories of harms its pursuing 
as a major premise, what legal precedent supports these theories of harms and how the remedies 
chosen relate to these theories of  harm – why they are deemed adequate, necessary and 
proportionate".181 In a situation "Where the Commission is not able to support the stated 
theories of harm with precedent, this indicates that a novel legal issue is involved, and the 
Commission should refrain from using the commitment procedure altogether".182 This would 
also increase transparency, which could ensure legal predictability and legal certainty for other 
undertakings and for third-party private litigants in follow-on actions for damages.  
                                               
179 Case C‑183/14 Salomie and Oltean para. 31 
180 See Graph 1 and 2  
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Based on this, one could argue that the Commission should be required to adopt a prohibition 
decision in novel, complex cases. This way, the undertaking concerned might have larger 
incentive to challenge the decision before the CJEU, which could set legal precedent on the 
matter in question. This would ensure legal certainty for undertakings in the future in line with 
the ECJ's statement in Salomie and Oltean.  
6.2 The "preliminary assessment" criterion 
Based on the foregoing chapters, the term "preliminary assessment" is the source to several of 
the procedural questions that have been discussed in this thesis. One might argue that the 
Commission's practice on issuing shorter, less formal letters as an alternative to a Statement of 
Objections is not satisfying. Further, one may ask whether the commitment decision scheme is 
entirely voluntary if the preliminary assessment does not inform the undertaking concerned of 
the objections raised against them in enough detail. Through the threat of a fine, practically 
inherent in a prohibition decision, one might risk that undertakings concerned offer 
commitments although they do not agree with the Commission, or if they do not have all the 
information needed to make an informed decision to offer commitments. This could distort the 
fundament in commitment decisions under Article 9, which is that the offering of commitments 
is voluntary. Recalling to chapter 5.3.2, an example of this risk in practice is the prohibition 
decision in the Google Search (Shopping) case, the decision stated, "Google did not agree with 
the legal analysis in the Preliminary Assessment and contested the assertion that any of the 
business practices described in it infringe Articles 102…".183 Google nevertheless offered 
commitments to the Commission.184   
To ensure legal certainty, a "preliminary assessment" should be more detailed and provide the 
undertaking with more specific information. If not identical to a Statement of Objections, an 
increased detailing level would ensure that the undertaking offers commitments on a completely 
voluntary basis. Considering the current difference in length and detail in a Statement of 
Objections and a preliminary assessment, one might argue that the Commission has set the 
standard too low for the "preliminary assessment" criterion. Based on the current detailing in 
"preliminary assessments", one may risk that the Commission's competition concerns are not 
                                               
183 Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), point 65 
184 Ibid. point 65 
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justified. Therefore, the standard for a preliminary assessment should be closer to the length 
and detail of a Statement of Objections than what it is in practice today.  
6.3 The limitation in Recital 13 
It is not certain whether Recital 13 limits the area of application of Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003. The current law is based on the Commission guidelines. However, this thesis has 
discussed whether other infringements than hardcore cartels are excluded from the Article 9 
procedure. The Commission's decisional practice implies that it is reluctant to adopt a 
commitment decision in other serious cases, but it has not been possible to further establish 
which types of cases the Commission will exclude from the Article 9 procedure.   
The Commission has rejected commitments in serious cases that are not hardcore/secret cartel 
cases without enough reasoning as to why the commitments were rejected. Based on the 
Telekomunikacja Polska case, one might argue that this implies that other infringements than 
hardcore/secret cartels are not appropriate for a commitment decision. As such, according to 
the current law, which only explicitly excludes hardcore/secret cartels, there is a risk of abusing 
Article 9 as a "short-cut" for frail evidence or as a regulatory instrument, even in serious 
breaches of the EU competition rules. To increase transparency and legal predictability, one 
could therefore argue that Regulation 1/2003 should be more well-defined as to which cases 
are appropriate/inappropriate for the Article 9 procedure. An alternative to this is that the 
Commission adopts self-binding guideline. These should make it clear which cases are 
appropriate for a commitment decision and set out factors or criteria that the Commission 
considers when deciding whether to accept commitments or not. Such a measure has already 
been adopted in countries like Italy, Greece, and Spain.185 The Commission's Notice on best 
practices has increased transparency on some level, but further specification is necessary. 
Currently, whether these potential consequences could become a reality or not seems to largely 
depend on the Commission's self-constraint, rather than on the control by the CJEU.  
                                               
185 OECD DAF/COMP/M (2016) 1/ANN3/FINAL, p. 5, 11 
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7 Final remarks    
To answer the research question of when Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is applicable, several 
aspects of the commitment decision scheme have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.  
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 does not prescribe when the Commission should choose a 
prohibition decision or a commitment decision. Article 9 only requires that the undertaking 
concerned offers commitments that meet the Commission's concerns expressed in its 
"preliminary assessment". A preliminary assessment may be shorter and less formal than a 
Statement of Objections, but negotiations on commitments cannot precede the issuing of a 
preliminary assessment. It is unclear whether this criterion imposes any other restrictions upon 
the Commission. Based on the analysis above, the Commission has a wide discretion to choose 
between the Article 7 or the Article 9 procedure.  
The scope of the area of application of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is limited by the fact that 
the Commission cannot impose a fine in combination with its commitment decision. Further, it 
is not clear whether Recital 13 last sentence imposes any limitations on the area of application 
and what those limitations potentially could be. The current law is nevertheless that the 
Commission's guidelines, which refer to Recital 13, limit Article 9's area of application by 
excluding hardcore/secret cartels from its application.  
This thesis illustrates that several essential questions concerning Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
are either open or should be discussed further. This particularly concerns the procedural issues 
relating to the Commission's understanding of the term "preliminary assessment" in Article 9 
and its direct conflict with the overall system in Regulation 1/2003. Furthermore, inherent in 
the voluntariness of the scheme, a commitment decision is rarely challenged before the CJEU 
either by the undertaking concerned itself or by third-parties. The Commission's application of 
Article 9 is therefore, to an extensive extent, outside the scope of judicial review. Based on this, 
the large use of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 could have a negative impact on judicial 
development of the EU competition rules. Such an impact would consequently decrease legal 
certainty and legal predictability. Based on the above, judicial development of Article 102 
TFEU is in the danger zone of stagnation. A question to reflect on: If commitment decisions 
did not exist, would the legal details of Article 102 have been developed further than what they 
are today?  
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Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, one might argue that Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003 should be modified. Further clarification of the commitment decision scheme is vital 
for legal certainty, progressive competition, and for preventing abuse of power. In this regard, 
to increase transparency, the standard for "preliminary assessment[s]" should be set at a more 
advanced level.  
Furthermore, the law on commitment decisions should be more well-defined as to which cases 
are appropriate/not appropriate for the Article 9 procedure. In the extension of this, novel, 
complex cases should be excluded from the commitment decision procedure. As such, to detect 
novel cases and increase transparency, the Commission should be required to state, in its 
commitment decision, its theory of harm, which legal precedent supports this theory, and why 
the binding commitments are sufficient to help the competition concerns. 
If Regulation 1/2003 is not modified, only the CJEU can clarify the scheme. Because 
commitment decisions are rarely challenged before the CJEU, this is not an ideal solution. 
Nevertheless, the Google and Alphabet case in progress, if appealed to the European Court of 
Justice, might contribute to a better understanding of the procedure under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003.186  
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Tables and charts 
Table 1: Decisions between 2005-2019 
Year Non-cartel prohibition 
decisions *without a fine 
under Article 23 (2) (a) 
Commitment decisions Total 
2005 2 
(Peugeot, Astra Zeneca) 
2 






(Premier League, Repsol, De 





Groupement des cartes 
bancaires*, Telefónica) 
5 
(Distrigaz, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, 











(Rambus, GDF – gas foreclosue, 
RWE – gas foreclosure, Ship 
classification, Microsoft-tying) 
6 
Total 2005-2009  9 (33 %) 18 (67 %) 27 
2010 1 
(French pharmacies - 
ONP) 
5 + ½  
(ENI, E.ON- gas foreclosure, 
Swedish interconnectors, EDF, 
BA/AA/IB, ½ Visa MIF) 
6 + ½  




(Standard & Poor's, IBM – 
maintenance services) 
3 
2012 0  5 
(Rio Tinto Alcan, Siemens/Areva, 
Reuters, E-books – Penguin, E-
books – “The four publishers" and 
Apple) 
5 













Servier, Slovak Telekom) 
1 + ½  
(Samsung UMTS, ½ Visa MIF) 
5 + ½  
Total 2010-2014 in 
numbers 
9 (35 %) 17 (65 %) 26 
2015 0 2 










(Google Shopping, Baltic 







Google Android, BEH 
gas, Asus – vertical 
restraints, Denon & 
Marantz - vertical 
restraints, Philips - 
vertical restraints, Pioneer 






(Mastercard II, Google 
Search Adsense, Nike) 
2 
(Cross-border access to Pay-tv, 
Mastercard/Visa) 
5 
Total 2015-2019 15 (63 %) 9 (37%) 24 
Total 2005-2019 33 (43 %) 
(6 without a fine – 18 
%) 
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Table 2: Procedural steps in prohibition decisions 




(red = no, green = yes) 
ARA foreclosure    
Astra Zeneca    
Asus    
Baltic Rail    
BEH gas   Decision not published 
CISAC    
Denon & Marantz    
Fentanyl    
French Pharmacies N/A   
Google (Android)    
Google (Shopping)    
Google Search (Adsense)    
Groupement des cartes 
bancaires 
   
Guess    
Intel    
International Skating 
Unions’ Eligibility 
   
Lundbeck    
Mastercard I    
Mastercard II    
Morgan Stanley/Visa    
Motorola GPRS    
Nike Decision not published  Decision not published 
OPCOM    
Perindopril (Servier)    
Phillips    
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Pioneer    
Qualcomm    
Slovak Telekom    
Telefonica    
Telefonica/Portugal 
Telecom 
   
Telekommunikacja Polska    
Tomra    
Peugeot    















Page 58 of 63 
 
Table 3: Procedural steps in commitment decisions 
Case Statement of Objections "preliminary assessment"  
German Football League – DFB   
Repsol   
Coca Cola    
Premier League   
De Beers   
Cannes Agreement   
Distrigaz   
DaimlerChrysler   
Fiat   
Toyota    
General Motors   
E.ON - electricity   
German electricity balancing 
market 
  
Rambus   
GDF – gas foreclosure   
RWE – gas foreclosure   
Ship classification   
Microsoft (tying)   
ENI   
E.ON gas   
Swedish Interconnectors   
EDF   
BA/AA/IB   
Visa MIF   
Standard and Poor's   
IBM – maintenance services   
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Rio Tinto Alcan   
Siemens/Areva   
Reuters   
E-books Penguin   






Deutche Bahn   
CEZ   
Samsung   
BEH electricity   
Skyteam   
Container shipping   
CDS – information market   
E-books (Amazon)   
Gazprom   
DE/DK Interconnector   
Cross-border access to Pay-tv   
Mastercard/Visa   
Total: 44 With Statement of Objection: 17 (39 
%) 
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Table 4: Commitment decisions in the energy sector187 








2006 1 Repsol      
2007 1 Distrigaz      
2008    2 








     
RWE- 
foreclosure 
   
2010 2 
ENI 
  2 
Swedish Interconnector 
  
E.ON gas   EDF   
2011       
2012       
2013    1 CEZ   
2014       
2015    1 BEH electricity   
2016       
2017       
2018 1 Gazprom   1 DE/DK Interconnector   




                                               
187 Data on structural commitments from Hjelmeng (2011) p. 51; Gerard (2013) p. 20; Schweitzer, (2008) p. 9; 
Dunne (2014) p. 408.  
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